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Summary: In 1992 Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary signed the 
Central European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA). In time, Czecho-
slovakia split into the Czech Republic and Slovakia, while Slovenia, 
Romania, Bulgaria, Croatia and Macedonia joined CEFTA. However, 
Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovenia and Slovakia left CEF-
TA on entering the European Union, which Bulgaria and Romania also 
joined later. The latter two, however, signed, along with 8 other parties 
(Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, FYR Macedonia, Moldova, Croatia, 
Serbia, Montenegro and UNMIK Kosovo), the Agreement on Amend-
ment of and Accession to the Central European Free Trade Agreement 
(CEFTA 2006) on 19 December 2006. This new CEFTA will replace 
over thirty bilateral free trade agreements concluded among them. 
After a short introduction, this paper argues that the purpose of CEFTA 
is to enable its members to enter the EU more easily, and thus serves 
as an instrument of EU accession. Reference is made to the most im-
portant benefi t of the old CEFTA, which was the common preparation 
for integration to the EU’s market. By analysing the impact of the old 
CEFTA as a pre-accession instrument, an analogy is made with the 
new CEFTA, where emphasis is placed on its role as a regional coop-
eration instrument. 
The paper aims to compare the provisions of CEFTA 2006, the Treaty 
establishing the European Community, and the Stabilisation and As-
sociation Agreement, mainly from the perspective of Croatia. Particular 
provisions of the Consolidated Version of CEFTA 2006 are discussed 
separately in the fourth part of this paper.
1 Introduction 
Discussion of trade liberalisation in South Eastern Europe (SEE) 
should perhaps start with the Memorandum of Understanding on Trade 
Facilitation and Liberalisation, concluded on 27 June 2001 within the 
framework of the Stability Pact for SEE. The Memorandum was signed 
by the representatives of Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, FYR 
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Macedonia, Croatia, Romania, while Yugoslavia and Moldova joined later. 
The main obligation arising from the Memorandum was for the countries 
to start negotiations on bilateral free trade agreements which should be 
concluded before the end of 2002. The outcome was the signing of more 
than 30 bilateral free trade agreements. 
Under the ‘patronage’ of the European Union (EU) and the Stability 
Pact, ‘[a]fter seven months of intensive negotiations’,1 Albania, Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, FYR Macedonia, Moldova, Croatia, Roma-
nia, Serbia, Montenegro and the United Nations Interim Administration 
Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) on behalf of Kosovo signed in Bucharest on 
19 December 2006 the Agreement on Amendment of and Accession to 
the Central European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA 2006)2 (hereinaf-
ter ‘Agreement’, ‘CEFTA 2006’, ‘the new CEFTA’). The anticipated date 
of ratifi cation of the Agreement was at the latest 1 May 2007 under the 
condition that the signatories (except Bulgaria and Romania) ratify the 
Agreement at the latest on 31 March 2007. Even before the expiry of that 
deadline, it was clear that the Agreement would not enter into force as 
predicted. In the period in between, while the Agreement was not yet in 
force, the parties would continue to apply the bilateral free trade agree-
ments. The Agreement would enter into force on the 30th day following the 
day that the fi fth signatory deposited the documents of ratifi cation. The 
remaining parties would apply bilateral free trade agreements until each 
of them had ratifi ed the Agreement. 
The bilateral free trade agreements had already brought free trade to 
the signatories, although not completely liberalised, but the new CEFTA 
would not provide that either. The new CEFTA ‘liberalises more than 90 
percent of trade and almost all trade in industrial products’.3 The bilat-
eral free trade agreements had established a free trade area for almost all 
industrial products and some agricultural products. 
The complex network of a large number of agreements, ‘the spaghetti 
bowl’,4 was consolidated into one Agreement. However a question arises 
- why is one multilateral agreement a better choice? One agreement cre-
1  A Milovan ‘Upitno zaživljavanje nove CEFTE do svibnja’ Privredni vjesnik (Zagreb 19 
March 2007) <http://www.privredni-vjesnik.hr/index.cgi?A=I&SIF=00003&BR=003455&
DA=20070319> accessed 11 July 2007 (author’s translation from Croatian to English). 
2  Agreement on Amendment of and Accession to the Central European Free Trade Agree-
ment (CEFTA 2006) available at <http://www.stabilitypact.org/wt2/TradeCEFTA2006.
asp> accessed 29 June 2007.
3  __ ‘U Bukureštu potpisan sporazum CEFTA-e’, 19 December 2006, <http://www.mingo.
hr/default.asp?id=1265&glink> accessed 29 June 2007 (author’s translation from Croatian 
to English).
4  L Niseteo StipiÊ, ‘Proširenje Cefte’ Privredni vjesnik, (Zagreb 13 November 2006) <http://
www.privredni-vjesnik.hr/index.cgi?A=I&SIF=00002&BR=003439&DA=20061113> ac-
cessed 12 July 2007.
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ates a better perception of the region as a whole, it is uniform, and the 
procedures are simplifi ed and therefore easier to apply. The new CEFTA 
means a deeper reinforcement of economic relationships, simplifi ed cus-
tom procedures, more effi cient and quicker exchange at borders, and a 
unifi cation of procedures. The new CEFTA would help countries join the 
EU more quickly, more easily, and make them better prepared. In fact, 
this is the most important role of the two CEFTAs, the old5 one, as the 
facts demonstrate, and the new one, as it is planned. 
 When discussing the potential increase in mutual trade among the 
new CEFTA members, two different views should be heard. Some sup-
pose that CEFTA 2006 will necessarily increase mutual trade. On the 
other hand, some believe that there will be no signifi cant increase. 
First, the idea will be heard that the new CEFTA could produce a 
great number of positive effects. Namely, by establishing a free trade area, 
a new market arises ‘consisting of the sum of the markets that join’.6 
The expansion of the markets would resolve, or at least start to resolve, 
some of the numerous problems of the SEE countries. Prices would fall 
following increased competition on the home market, in the region, and 
also in third countries. Furthermore, the employment rate would rise. 
The CEFTA area in turn would become more attractive for foreign direct 
investment. Clearly, the trading power of each country would be stronger 
within the area than it would be outside. Finally, state policies would be 
more stable and security would be stronger, which, taken together, would 
allow for the strengthening of European trading networks.7 
However, some opine that there is no reason to expect a signifi cant 
increase in trade within the area through the new CEFTA. The fi rst reason 
is that ‘trade is already liberalised and, for the time being, the existing 
bilateral agreements are not applied entirely. A multilateral agreement 
will not by itself encourage trade; it is necessary to develop other instru-
ments as well, fi rstly through joint projects.’8 Furthermore, a period of 
5  The term ‘old CEFTA’ implies CEFTA before the signing of the Agreement on Amendment 
of and Accession to the Central European Free Trade Agreement in 2006 (CEFTA 2006), 
often excluding Croatia in that respect. The chronology of CEFTA is given in the second part 
of this paper.
6  G Cassano and S Onelli, ‘Vantaggi e prospettive di un’area di integrazione commerciale 
nell’ Europa di Sud Est’ <http://www.mincomes.it/balcani/vantaggi_prospettive/indice.
htm> accessed 29 June 2007 (author’s translation from Italian to English.
7  Compare G Cassano and S Onelli, ‘Vantaggi e prospettive di un’area di integrazione com-
merciale nell’europa di Sud Est’ <http://www.mincomes.it/balcani/vantaggi_prospettive/
indice.htm> accessed 29 June 2007.
8  K Jurlin and V Samardžija, ‘PodruËje slobodne trgovine jugoistoËne Europe veÊ je formi-
rano’ (Comment 13 February 2006) <http://www.entereurope.hr/cpage.aspx?page=clanci.
aspx&pageID=171&grupaID=2&clanakID=801> accessed 29 June 2007 (author’s transla-
tion from Croatian to English).
562 Marta KrizmaniÊ: The New CEFTA with Special Reference to its Infl uence on Accession...
time, perhaps a few years, needs to pass before the Agreement can work. 
The second reason is that the EU is the main trading partner of each of 
the countries in the region, and that ‘[t]he experience of CEFTA tells us 
that the free trade area has not signifi cantly increased mutual trade, 
because the signatories were primarily encouraged to strengthen coop-
eration with the EU’.9 Regarding foreign investments, it seems that they 
have increased in the old CEFTA countries because of ‘the certainty of EU 
accession’10 not because those countries were members of that regional 
trade organisation. 
CEFTA’s economic role is very important, but so is the political one. 
Here, the objective is to join the EU. The instrument of free trade is at 
the same time an objective and a means to that end. In this light, Croatia 
entered into the SAA with the European Communities and their Member 
States,11 as has Macedonia. In order to comply with CEFTA’s purpose of 
integration into the EU, it is necessary for all CEFTA members to con-
clude free trade agreements with the EU. 
Pekka Huhtaniemi, Under-Secretary of State, during the ceremony 
of the signing of the new CEFTA and on behalf of the Finnish EU Presi-
dency, made the following claim for CEFTA 2006: ‘This inclusive Regional 
Free Trade Agreement is a substantial step forwards both economically 
and politically’.12 He went on to recall the European Council’s Conclu-
sions when it welcomed the signing of the Agreement: ‘The new CEFTA 
will be a substantial step forward both economically and politically’13 
and that the European Council ‘looks forward to a regional and inclusive 
trade agreement’.14
This paper will attempt to highlight CEFTA as an instrument for 
accession to the EU. If we consider it as an instrument for a regional ap-
proach and for a regional policy, we can see CEFTA as a mechanism for 
regional cooperation, a condition set in the SAA and in the Stabilisation 
and Association Process.
9  Ibid. 
10  Ibid. 
11  Published in Croatia, Offi cial Gazette, International Agreements 14/2001. The acronym 
SAA will be used in this Paper for the particular ‘Croatian’ Stabilisation and Association 
Agreement. The SAA was signed on 29 October 2001 and entered into force on 1 February 
2005. 
12  P Huhtaniemi at the signing ceremony of the modernised CEFTA (Statement 19 De-
cember 2006) <http://213.214.146.178/public/default.aspx?contentid=85113&nodeid=1
5145&contentlan=2&culture=en-US> accessed 29 June 2007.
13  Brussels European Council, Presidency Conclusions (14/15 December 2006) Point 14 
<http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/92202.
pdf> accessed 12 July 2007.
14  Ibid.
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Not contrary to the notion of CEFTA as an instrument of the SAA, 
economic cooperation in the region strengthened by CEFTA is at the 
same time the foundation, the instrument and the purpose of CEFTA. 
Why foundation? It is because trade is the main basis of CEFTA. Its 
mechanism is trade between its members. Why instrument? Because 
only through economic cooperation and trade does CEFTA exist. And fi -
nally, why purpose? For the reason that the sound application of CEFTA 
will lead to good economic cooperation and result in the countries, if not 
the region as whole, becoming part of the EU. This economic coopera-
tion is very signifi cant ‘as trade and investment are important tools in 
moving the region as a whole forward.’15 Besides, ‘the new CEFTA, along 
with the SAA process, provides a spur to further reducing national ob-
stacles to trade and investment and opening up markets to competition 
and growth.’16 
Concerning the SEE countries’ obligations towards the EU and the 
World Trade Organisation (WTO), CEFTA is ‘fully compatible with their 
WTO and EU obligations’.17 Besides being a preparation for entrance to 
the EU, CEFTA 2006 is also preparation to enter the WTO.
2 Remarks on CEFTA in connection to accession to the EU 
CEFTA was founded in 1992 in Krakow when the founders, Poland, 
Czechoslovakia and Hungary, signed the Central European Free Trade 
Agreement. CEFTA’s main objectives were to establish a free trade area, 
promote investments, and integrate economies.
In parallel with CEFTA, the founders liberalised their trading rela-
tions with the EU. Trading integration is very important with regard to 
relations with the EU, since it represents the ‘indicators of economical 
integration’.18 
CEFTA has expanded several times. At fi rst, the number of mem-
bers expanded (without an expansion of territory) when Czechoslovakia 
split into two states in 1993. Slovenia joined CEFTA in 1996, Romania in 
1997, Bulgaria in 1998, Croatia in 2003 and Macedonia in 2006. Mem-
bers of CEFTA had set conditions for joining. One was being a member 
15  Zagreb Declaration of the 10th Meeting of the Heads of State and Government of the 
South-East European Co-operation Process (SEECP) Europe’s New South East (Zagreb 11 
May 2007) Point 13, <http://www.mvpei.hr/seecp/docs/070514_SEECP%20Summit%20
Declaration%20usvojeno%20110507.pdf > accessed 27 June 2007.
16  Ibid.
17  Conclusions of the Regional Table of the Stability Pact (Zagreb 10 May 2007) 3 <http://
www.stabilitypact.org/pages/press/detail.asp?y=2007&p=543> accessed 29June 2007.
18  V ©ošiÊ and B VujËiÊ, ‘Trgovinska integracija i pridruživanje Hrvatske Europskoj uniji’ 
in K Ott (ed) ‘Pridruživanje Hrvatske Europskoj uniji: ususret izazovima pregovora., treÊi 
svezak’ (2005) Institut za javne fi nancije 60.
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of WTO, and another was being an associated member of the EU. Nowa-
days, these conditions no longer apply. As for WTO relations, it is nec-
essary for a potential CEFTA member to comply with WTO rules, while 
some sort of institutional relation between the potential CEFTA candidate 
and the EU should also exist. 
On joining the EU on 1 May 2004, Poland, the Czech Republic, Hun-
gary, Slovenia and Slovakia left CEFTA, which was downsized just as the 
EU was enlarged. 1 May 2004 is a signifi cant date, not only for the EU 
and its big enlargement, but also for other multilateral and bilateral eco-
nomical arrangements in Europe. The European Economic Area (EEA), 
the world’s most integrated regional market, expanded, the Baltic Free 
Trade Area (BAFTA) ceased to exist, and a large number of bilateral agree-
ments that the new EU members had concluded with countries that were 
not members of the EU and EEA were to be terminated. 
For a time, CEFTA consisted only of Croatia, Bulgaria and Romania. 
The future of CEFTA was therefore in doubt, especially taking into ac-
count that Bulgaria and Romania were very close to entering the EU and 
Croatia was not very far from that goal. 
After Macedonia had joined CEFTA in the middle of 2006, the new 
CEFTA idea fi nally came to life when the Agreement was signed at the 
end of 2006. CEFTA would once more be large. The predicted ‘big bang’19 
enlargement and expansion of CEFTA had fi nally occurred. 
However, Romania and Bulgaria became members of the EU on 1 
January 2007 and left CEFTA. 
Old CEFTA played a very important role in EU accession but it should 
not be forgotten that CEFTA was no more than an ‘interim arrangement 
to serve a basic market integration function as part of EU pre-acces-
sion.’20 When the old CEFTA and BAFTA members (Estonia, Lithuania 
and Latvia) left those organisations and entered the EU, we can say that 
CEFTA and BAFTA had acted ‘as subregional components of EU pre-ac-
cession, [and] enlargement proper meant that they had reached the point 
where their purpose was served’.21 
The question arises whether new CEFTA will be able to follow old 
CEFTA’s role in offering a step towards the EU. To put the question an-
other way, we can ask whether it will ‘reproduce its central European role 
or redefi ne itself in South East Europe.’22
19  M Dangerfi eld, ‘Subregional Integration and EU Enlargement: Where Next for CEFTA?’ 
(2006) Journal of Common Market Studies 44 (2) 315.
20  Ibid 309.
21  Ibid 307. 
22  Ibid 308. 
565CYELP 3 [2007] 559-579
The EU market, the world’s biggest market, consists of approximate-
ly 469 million consumers. The market of the future CEFTA composed of 
‘Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Serbia, Macedonia, Alba-
nia, Kosovo (UNMIK) and Moldova, will represent a market of around 27 
million potential consumers.’23 These fi gures motivate the countries to 
join both organisations, and at the same time help them to visualise the 
benefi ts of accession. 
The EU is the most important trade partner of the SEE countries 
just as was the case for the Central and Eastern European countries be-
fore they joined the EU. 
Broadly speaking, trade is the essence of European integration, and 
a single market is ‘one of the main accomplishments of economic inte-
gration within the EU.’24 A very effi cient method of achieving good trade 
exchange is by establishing free trade areas. The EU applies the instru-
ment of establishing free trade areas in its enlargement policy, and in its 
Neighbourhood Policy as well. Free trade areas with third countries form 
a very important part of the European Neighbourhood Policy.
The requirement of an established market economy and the ability 
to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the EU, along 
with their subcriteria,25 are a part of the economic criteria set as EU ac-
cession criteria. The ability to cope with competitive pressure and market 
forces within the EU ‘implies the minimal level of competitiveness in the 
main economical sectors of the candidate country.’26 Among other things, 
‘the level and the speed of trade integration with EU before enlargement 
(the extent and the types of categories of goods in exchange with Member 
States)’27 is to be evaluated in that respect. 
CEFTA 2006 is one of the methods to help achieve the objective of 
coping with the competitiveness and strength of the EU market. 
The EU market is constantly changing and the acquis communau-
taire and the fi eld of adaptation and harmonisation are expanding (ie 
with every enlargement of the EU and with the passing of time). There-
fore, candidate countries have to put in further efforts during the acces-
sion process. It has to be borne in mind that competitiveness is evaluated 
in accordance with the changed market. Through the enlargement of the 
23  Milovan (n 1). 
24  A-M Boromisa ‘©to proširenje Europske unije znaËi za Hrvatsku’ in: K. Ott, ed. 
Pridruživanje Hrvatske Europskoj uniji: ususret izazovima pregovora treÊi svezak (2005) 
Institut za javne fi nancije 34 (author’s translation from Croatian to English).
25  See V ©ošiÊ and B VujËiÊ, ‘Trgovinska integracija i pridruživanje Hrvatske Europskoj 
uniji’ in K Ott (ed), ‘Pridruživanje Hrvatske Europskoj uniji: ususret izazovima pregovora., 
treÊi svezak’ (2005) Institut za javne fi nancije.
26  Boromisa (n 24) 31. 
27  Boromisa (n 24) 31.
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EU, the internal market is also being enlarged, competition grows, and 
consequently the demands to cope with competitive pressure and market 
forces alter as well. Candidate countries constantly have to track all of 
these changes and adjust to them. In other words, and to borrow an apt 
saying, the EU is a ‘moving target’. 
3 CEFTA as an EU policy towards the SEE countries 
The EU aspires to ensure peace, freedom, stability, economic growth 
and development in the SEE countries. These countries have the oppor-
tunity to conclude stabilisation and association agreements. Indeed, the 
EU believes that trading policy is key for stabilisation in the region and 
for economic development. 
Olli Rehn, European Commissioner for Enlargement, stated that ‘Re-
gional cooperation is a key element of EU policy in the region. It will help 
bring the region closer to the EU.’28 Referring to CEFTA, and with a view 
to other agreements (the Energy Community Treaty and the European 
Common Aviation Area Agreement), he stated that ‘Recent agreements 
and initiatives testify that the agendas of regional cooperation and Euro-
pean integration are increasingly intertwined.’29 
The EU develops its trade relations in the region on three levels. The 
fi rst one is the bilateral level and includes the signing of Stabilisation and 
Association Agreements. The multilateral one is in respect of supporting 
the countries of the region to become members of the WTO. The third one 
is a regional one, supporting and encouraging CEFTA. 
SAAs regulate liberalisation of trade in goods with the aim of devel-
oping a free trade area that is gradual and asymmetric in respect of full 
liberalisation of imports into the EU, and gradual in respect of imports 
into the Stabilisation and Association countries. Regional cooperation is 
a very important factor of evaluation for the countries of the region in 
their approach to the EU, and free trade areas are one method of forming 
best regional cooperation. In the Preamble of the SAA, it is laid down that, 
among other things, the importance given to the SAA within the frame-
work of the Stabilisation and Association Process of the SEE countries 
and within the framework of the Stability Pact is to be taken into consid-
eration. The commitment of the parties to free trade, in accordance with 
the rights and obligations arising from the WTO, is especially taken into 
account. One of the scopes of the SAA is the creating of a new climate for 
economic relations in the region, especially for the development of trade 
28  O Rehn, ‘Regional Cooperation at the heart of EU’ (Speech) (SEECP Summit Zagreb 
11 May 2007) <http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/07/
302&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en> accessed 27June 2007.
29  Ibid.
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and investment. The SAA in Croatia’s case provides that one of the aims 
of the Association is to develop gradually a free trade area between the 
Community and Croatia, as well as to foster regional cooperation in all 
the fi elds covered by the SAA (Art 1, SAA). 
In Art 12, the SAA provides for Croatia’s obligation towards region-
al cooperation in all the fi elds covered by the SAA with any country or 
countries that have already signed a Stabilisation and Association Agree-
ment. After signing the SAA, Croatia is obliged to start negotiations and 
to conclude bilateral conventions on regional cooperation. The aim of the 
negotiations and the convention is to enhance the scope of cooperation 
between the Stabilisation and Association countries and, most impor-
tantly, to establish a free trade area in accordance with the parties and 
according to WTO rules. The Macedonian SAA contains the very same 
provision. Both Croatia and Macedonia were obliged to conclude the con-
ventions within two years of the entry into force of the SAA. 
This new approach of the EU, the regional approach, ‘made closer 
contractual ties with the target countries’.30 In contrast, the former asso-
ciation agreements, called the European Agreements, neither had these 
provisions nor did they include the obligation stemming from the Stabili-
sation and Association Process. The EU perceives ‘free trade solely as an 
initial step in a long-term process’.31
Croatia has further accepted, in Art 13 of the SAA, the obligation to co-
operate with other countries concerned with the Stabilisation and Associa-
tion Process in accordance with the principles and objectives of the SAA. 
Finally, the possibility for cooperation with other EU candidate coun-
tries is foreseen in Art 14 of the SAA.
The SAA is ‘the main pre-accession instrument’.32 Although not 
mentioned in the SAA, its goal is ‘EU membership’.33 In that respect, we 
can defi ne CEFTA as the sub-pre-accession instrument with the aim of 
entering the EU. 
CEFTA is an instrument to meet the obligation for SAA regional co-
operation. The candidate countries and future candidate countries fulfi l 
a large part of their SAA obligations through CEFTA. As elaborated in 
Part 4 of this paper, CEFTA’s obligations intertwine with EU obligations. 
In some parts, CEFTA even implies the application of European law. 
30  D Bechev, ‘Carrots, sticks and norms: the EU and regional cooperation in Southeast 
Europe’ (2006) Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans, 8 (1) 32.
31  Ibid 38. 
32  S Rodin, ‘Sporazum o stabilizaciji i pridruživanju - interpretacija i primjena’ (Presen-
tation) slide 5 <http://eu.pravo.hr/fi leadmin/Europsko/dokumenti/Powerpoint/SSP_01_
2004_Rodin.ppt> accessed 29 June 2007 (author’s translation from Croatian to English).
33  Ibid.
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4 Consolidated version of CEFTA 2006 
The Agreement on Amendment of and Accession to the Central Eu-
ropean Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA 2006) consists of two annexes. The 
fi rst one is the Consolidated Version of the Central European Free Trade 
Agreement (CEFTA 2006)34 and the second one consists of a list of bilat-
eral free trade agreements that will terminate when CEFTA 2006 comes 
into force. 
In this part of the paper, a comparison among the Agreement, the 
SAA and the Treaty establishing the European Community (TEC)35 will 
be made with the goal of better understanding the objective of the Agree-
ment’s provisions and making correlations among their respective provi-
sions. 
The Consolidated Version of CEFTA 2006 starts with the preamble 
and continues with the fi rst article that sets the objective of establishing 
a free trade area transitional period, ending at the latest by 31 December 
2010, in accordance with the WTO provisions. 
The Agreement further consists of 7 chapters that will be discussed 
in consecutive order in this paper.
The beginning of Chapter 1 regulating the general obligations ap-
plicable to trade in all goods provides that the goods in the trade be-
tween the parties shall be classifi ed in accordance with the Combined 
Nomenclature (CN) (Art 2 para 1) in the same manner as it is classifi ed 
in the EU. The SAA regulates the classifi cation of goods with the same 
method (Art 15 para 2 SAA). 
34  The fi rst annex consists of the Preamble, 52 Articles, 4 Joint Declarations and the fol-
lowing 9 Annexes: 
Annex 1 Product lines falling within CN chapters 25 to 97 considered agricultural products 
in the Agreement 
Annex 2 Industrial products not liberalised on the date of entry into force of the Agreement 
(referred to in Art 8 paras 1 and 2)
Annex 3 Agricultural concessions (referred to in Art 10 para 1)
Annex 4 Protocol concerning the defi nition of the concept of ‘originating products’ and 
methods of administrative cooperation (referred to in Art 14 paras 1 and 3)
Annex 5 On mutual administrative assistance in customs matters (referred to in Art 14 
paras 2 and 3)
Annex 6 Existing bilateral investment agreements between parties (referred to in Art 30 
paras 1, 2 and 3 )
Annex 7 Agreements and Conventions relating to the protection of intellectual property 
rights (referred to in Art 39 para 2 and Art 38 paras 2 and 3)
Annex 8 Appointment of a mediator (referred to in Art 42 para 3)
Annex 9 Constitution and functioning of the arbitral tribunal (referred to in Art 43 para 3). 
35  Treaty establishing the European Community (consolidated text), OJ C 325/1, 24 De-
cember 2002.
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The basic duty to which the successive reductions set out in the 
Agreement are to be applied shall be the duty that was actually applied 
in trade between the parties on the day preceding the entry into force of 
the Agreement (Art 2 para 2). 
The parties are obliged to abolish all customs duties on exports, 
charges having equivalent effect, and export duties of a fi scal nature in 
trade between them starting on the date of entry into force of the Agree-
ment (Art 4 para 1) and it is prohibited to introduce new ones (Art 4 para 
2). As for customs duties on imports, a standstill clause is introduced. In 
trade between the parties, starting from the day preceding the signature 
of the Agreement, it is prohibited to introduce new customs duties on 
imports, charges having equivalent effect, and import duties of a fi scal 
nature, and those which already exist shall not be increased (Art 5). The 
parties are obliged, starting from the entry into force of the Agreement, 
to abolish customs fees contrary to Art VIII of GATT, as well as any other 
similar charges between them in their trade (Art 6). 
The SAA anticipates that upon its entry into force, customs duties 
on imports into the Community of products originating in Croatia shall 
be abolished (Art 17 para 1 SAA) and customs duties on imports of prod-
ucts originating in the Community into Croatia shall be abolished gradu-
ally within the transitional period laid down in the SAA (Art 18 paras 1, 
2 and 3 SAA), although Croatia agreed to reduce its customs duties in 
trade with the Community more rapidly if its general economic situation 
and the situation of the economic sector concerned permit (Art 21 SAA). 
The charges with an effect equivalent to customs duties on imports are 
abolished upon the entry into force of the SAA (Art 19 SAA).
Art 25 of the TEC provides that custom duties on imports and ex-
ports, as well as charges having equivalent effect and custom duties of a 
fi scal nature, are prohibited between member states. 
It is very interesting to have a parallel view of one of the so-called 
‘mirror provisions’ of the SAA and TEC and, in respect of this Paper, 
of the Agreement. Mirror provisions are those SAA provisions ‘that are 
identical or substantially similar to the provisions of the TEC’36 and they 
‘require knowledge of EC law’.37 But are they really the same provisions? 
Do we interpret them in the same way? And what about the Agreement’s 
provisions? Are they substantially similar to those of the TEC and SAA? 
The answer is no. We will explain why once we have compared the men-
tioned provisions. 
On the day of the Agreement’s entering into force, all quantitative re-
strictions on imports and exports, as well as measures having equivalent 
36  S Rodin (n 32) slide 10. 
37  Ibid slide 23.
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effect, will be abolished in trade between the parties (Art 3 para 1) and the 
introduction of new ones is prohibited (Art 3 para 2).
The SAA regulates the abolition of quantitative restrictions and meas-
ures having equivalent effect on imports into the Community for goods 
originating in Croatia (Art 17 para 2 SAA) and the abolition of the quanti-
tative restrictions and measures having equivalent effect on imports into 
Croatia for products originating in the Community (Art 18 para 4 SAA) 
upon the entry into force of the SAA. Upon the entry into force of the SAA, 
the parties shall abolish between themselves all quantitative restrictions 
on exports and measures having equivalent effect (Art 20 para 2 SAA).
The TEC provides that all quantitative restrictions on imports and 
exports and all measures having equivalent effect between the members 
states shall be abolished (Arts 28 and 29 TEC). The TEC provides in Art 
30 that the provisions of Art 28 and 29 do not preclude prohibitions or 
restrictions on imports, exports or goods in transit justifi ed on grounds of 
public morality, public policy or public security; the protection of health 
and life of humans, animals or plants; the protection of national treas-
ures possessing artistic, historic or archaeological value; or the protec-
tion of industrial and commercial property. It is also provided that such 
prohibitions or restrictions shall not constitute a means of arbitrary dis-
crimination or a disguised restriction on trade between Member States.
The SAA in Art 42 regulates authorised restrictions with the ap-
proach that it does not preclude prohibitions or restrictions on imports, 
exports or goods in transit justifi ed on grounds of public morality, public 
policy or public security; the protection of health and life of humans, 
animals or plants; the protection of national treasures of artistic, historic 
or archaeological value or the protection of intellectual, industrial and 
commercial property, or rules relating to gold and silver. However, such 
prohibitions or restrictions cannot be applied if they constitute a means 
of arbitrary discrimination or a disguised restriction on trade between 
Croatia and the Community. 
The Agreement allows the general exemption in Art 17 in a very simi-
lar way. It does not preclude the prohibition or restriction on imports, 
exports, or goods in transit justifi ed on grounds of public morality, public 
policy or public security, the protection of health and life of humans, 
animal or plants, the protection of national treasures possessing artistic, 
historic or archaeological value, the protection of intellectual property or 
rules relating to gold or silver or the conservation of exhaustible natu-
ral resources, if such measures are made effective in conjunction with 
restrictions on domestic production or consumption. Again, such pro-
hibitions or restrictions cannot be applied if they constitute a means of 
arbitrary discrimination or a disguised restriction on trade between the 
parties.
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The European Court of Justice has an abundance of case law on 
the free movement of goods. At this point it is interesting to note that the 
European Court of Justice interprets differently the provisions of the TEC 
and similar provisions in association agreements. 
A very important case in this respect is Polydor38 concerning the 
relations between intellectual property rights and the free movement of 
goods. This case is signifi cant since it shows that similar provisions in 
an association agreement and in the TEC can serve different purposes. 
The issue relates to similar terminology stemming from different sources 
(different agreements) that are not interpreted equally. Namely, it was 
emphasised in the judgment summary that the Agreement between the 
European Economic Community and the Portuguese Republic of 1972 
(Portuguese Agreement) did not have the same purpose as the TEC, even 
though it consisted of unconditional restraint of some trade restrictions 
between the Community and Portugal (just like the quantitative restric-
tions and measures having equivalent effect) provided for in the TEC. 
The similarity of terms is not suffi cient reason for transposing the case 
law of the European Court of Justice to the provisions of the Portuguese 
Agreement (as expressed in point 15 of the Judgement). The reason is 
that the purposes of the Portuguese Agreement and TEC are different. 
The purpose of the Portuguese Agreement is to consolidate and to extend 
the economic relations existing between the Community and Portugal, 
and to ensure the development of their trade relations (point 10 of the 
Judgement). The objective of the TEC, on the other hand, is to unite 
national markets as closely as possible in a single market with all the 
characteristics of a national market (point 16 of the Judgement). Finally, 
it is concluded that the Polydor restrictions are justifi ed on the ground 
of the protection of industrial and commercial property, although such 
justifi cation would not be possible within the Community (point 19 of the 
Judgement).
This case is very important for the purpose of this paper since it 
shows different interpretations of equal provisions in different circum-
stances. It therefore follows that while interpreting CEFTA provisions, the 
object and purpose have to be taken into account. This could especially 
be emphasised in competition law where, as explained later in the paper, 
the Agreement explicitly determines the application of the rules and prin-
ciples of European competition law.
Returning to the Agreement, apart from the general exemption, it 
also foresees a security exemption. A party has the possibility to take any 
necessary measure to prevent the disclosure of information contrary to 
its essential security interests as laid out in Art 18. 
38  Case 270/80 Polydor Ltd. and RSO Records Inc. v. Harlequin Records Shops Limited and 
Simons Records Limited [1982] ECR 329.
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As the Agreement determines in Chapter 2, Industrial Products are 
products originating in parties falling within CN Chapters 25 to 97, ex-
cept those listed in Annex 1 (Art 7). The parties are obliged to abolish all 
customs duties on imports, as well as all charges having equivalent effect 
and all import duties of a fi scal nature in trade between them on the date 
of entry into force of the Agreement on all products except those subject 
to bilateral concessions (Art 8 para 1). The exemptions are listed in Annex 
2. These products will be liberalised in the transitional period ending on 
31 December 2008. In old CEFTA the trade of industrial products was 
fully liberalised.39 In new CEFTA, a small amount of protected products 
is introduced. 
Chapter 3 of the Agreement relates to Agricultural Products. The 
Agreement determines that agricultural products are those originating in 
the parties falling within CN Chapter 1 to 24 and those products listed 
in Annex 1 (Art 9). All Customs duties on imports, all charges having 
equivalent effect, other import duties of a fi scal nature on products listed 
in Annex 3 shall be reduced or abolished in accordance with the sched-
ules laid out in Annex 3 (Art 10 para 1). The parties are obliged to apply 
Most Favoured Nation duty on the imports of products listed in Annex 
3 in the cases where they would be lower than the preferential customs 
duties laid out in Annex 3 (Art 10 para 2). 
The lists of products are the same as those in the bilateral agree-
ments. Therefore, CEFTA 2006 does not introduce any new liberalisation 
of trade of agricultural products, but the parties are obliged to examine 
within the Joint Committee, not later than 1 May 2009, the possibilities 
of granting each other further concessions (Art 10 para 3). The agricul-
tural policy of the parties is not limited in any way by the Agreement, but 
the parties are obliged to inform the Joint Committee of changes in their 
agricultural policies or applied measures which may affect the conditions 
of agricultural trade among the parties. They are also obliged to refrain 
from using export subsidies and to abolish any such existing subsidies 
in their mutual trade, regardless of Art 21 para 240 (Art 11). The rights 
and obligations of parties concerning the application of sanitary and phy-
tosanitary measures are to be applied in accordance with the WTO Agree-
ment on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures. 
The rights and obligations of the parties concerning Technical Bar-
riers to Trade and the elimination of those barriers will be determined 
39  Compare A Milovan, ‘Upitno zaživljavanje nove CEFTE do svibnja’ Privredni vjesnik (Za-
greb 19 March 2007) <http://www.privredni-vjesnik.hr/index.cgi?A=I&SIF=00003&BR=00
3455&DA=20070319> accessed 11 July 2007 (author’s translation from Croatian to Eng-
lish). 
40  Art 21 para 2 provides that Art 21 para 1 which regulates state aid will not apply to ag-
ricultural products regulated in Chapter 3.
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in accordance with the WTO provisions except for the exemptions pre-
scribed in Chapter 4, Art 13 of the Agreement. In Art 13 para 4 it is pre-
scribed that the parties are obliged to enter into negotiations to conclude 
multilateral agreements on harmonisation of their technical regulations 
and standards, and on the recognition of the conformity assessment pro-
cedures between themselves, all in accordance with the WTO Agreement 
on Technical Barriers to Trade and other international agreements, all 
before 31 December 2010. 
General Provisions deal with the Operating rules, Competition 
Rules and Contingent Protection Rules. 
The rules of origin and the methods for administrative cooperation in 
customs matters are laid out in Annex 4 (Art 14) and are very similar to 
those provided in the bilateral agreements. The novelty is the possibility 
of application of diagonal cumulation of origins of goods in mutual trade 
with the possibility of later cumulation as well with the EU once all the 
states comply with the provisions and conditions of the cumulation. 
The Agreement prohibits fi scal discrimination. The parties are not 
allowed to introduce any measure or practice of an internal fi scal nature 
establishing, directly or indirectly, discrimination between the products 
originating in the parties. If there is any such measure in force, the par-
ties are obliged to abolish it. Secondly, the products which are exported 
to the territory of one of the countries are not allowed to benefi t from 
repayment of domestic taxation that exceeds the amount of indirect taxa-
tion imposed on them (Art 15). SAA regulates the fi scal discrimination 
prohibition in a similar way in Art 34.
As for payments, payments in freely convertible currencies in con-
nection with trade in goods between the parties are free and without bar-
riers. Transfers of those payments to the territory of the party where the 
creditor resides are also free and without any restrictions (Art 16).
 The competition rules consist of regulations concerning state mo-
nopolies, competition rules in a narrow sense and state aid (Arts 19-21). 
All the provisions concerning competition law rules are comparable to the 
analogical provisions of the TEC and SAA. At this point, mirror provisions 
are encountered again.
The parties are obliged to adjust state monopolies of a commercial 
character or state-trading enterprises in order to ensure that there is no 
discrimination between enterprises of the parties relating to the condi-
tions under which products are marketed, all in accordance with WTO 
rules. No new discrimination may be introduced. The parties are obliged 
to inform the Joint Committee about the measures they will apply in or-
der to comply with the provisions of the Agreement concerning the above-
mentioned rules (Art 19). There is a very similar provision on state mo-
nopolies, albeit with some distinctions, in the texts of the SAA and TEC. 
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All agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations of 
undertakings and concerted practices between undertakings which have 
as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of compe-
tition in the territories of the parties as a whole or in a substantial part 
of them are incompatible with the proper functioning of the Agreement 
insofar as they may affect trade between the parties (Art 20 para 1 point 
a). 
The abuse of a dominant position by one or more undertakings in 
the territories of the parties as a whole or in a substantial part thereof 
is incompatible with the proper functioning of the Agreement insofar as 
it may affect trade between the parties (Art 20 para 1 point b). These 
competition law rules are the mirror provisions of Art 70 para 1 point i) 
and ii) of the SAA. The Agreement determines that the above-mentioned 
competition law rules provided for in Art 20 para 1 and 2 shall be applied 
at the latest by 1 May 2010 to the activities of all undertakings, including 
public undertakings and undertakings to which the parties grant special 
or exclusive rights. 
As for undertakings entrusted with the operation of services of gen-
eral economic interest or having the character of a revenue-producing 
monopoly, Art 20 para 1 and 2 applies insofar as it does not obstruct 
the performance of that particular task in law or fact (Art 20 para 3). The 
provisions of Art 20 para 1 point a) shall not be applied on the agricul-
tural products listed in Annex 3 if they form an integral part of a domestic 
market organisation.
Just as the Agreement refers to the obligation of complying with 
the principles of the European competition law rules applicable in the 
European Community, especially provided in Arts 81, 82 and 86 of the 
TEC, the same rule can be found in the SAA in Art 70 para 2. Therefore, 
European law has to be consulted while applying the Agreement and in-
terpreting it. 
Besides the obligation to apply European law, the parties are ex-
pressly obliged by the Agreement to apply the national competition law 
rules in a manner which eliminates the above-mentioned procedures 
which are contrary to competition law rules. They are also obliged to co-
operate and exchange information in this fi eld. 
The measures to be taken in the case of a breach of the provisions 
set out in Art 20 paras 1 to 4 are those prescribed in Art 24 which regu-
lates the conditions and the procedure of performing the measures re-
ferred to in Arts 20, 21 and 23. 
Regarding state aids, every aid granted by a party or through state 
resources in any form which distorts or threatens to distort competition 
by favouring certain goods is held to be incompatible with the proper 
functioning of the Agreement, insofar as it may affect trade between the 
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party concerned and other parties (Art 21 para 1). This article does not 
relate to agricultural products (Art 21 para 2).
The Agreement mentions once more the obligation to apply the Euro-
pean law principles and rules. It refers to the state aid provisions set out 
in Art 87 of TEC (Art 21 para 4). The SAA again mentions the same obli-
gation of the parties in Art 70 para 2. We come to the obligation relating 
to the implementation of the same provisions in national legal systems 
(Art 21 para 3). With the scope of ensuring transparency in the area of 
state aid, the parties are obliged to report to the Joint Committee annu-
ally and, upon request, to other parties on the total amount and distribu-
tion of the aid given (Art 21 para 7).
However, the parties still have the right to take countervailing meas-
ures in compliance with the relevant articles of GATT and the WTO Agree-
ment on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures or internal legislation 
(Art 21 para 6).
In the Joint Declaration referring to Arts 20 and 21, the parties de-
clare that they will bring the competition provisions into compliance with 
the principles of Arts 81, 82, 86 and 87 of the TEC and that they will 
establish an operationally independent authority responsible for the ap-
plication of competition and state aid rules, all of which not later than 1 
May 2010. 
In comparative terms, this fi eld of law is very rich in detail and prac-
tice, especially European competition law, but also the national com-
petition laws of the member states. The provisions of the Agreement on 
competition law contribute to this fi eld of law in the region and mark a 
considerable step forward.
Contingent Protection Rules relate to Anti-Dumping Measures, Gen-
eral Safeguards, Conditions and Procedures for Taking Measures, and 
Balance of Payments Diffi culties.
Dumping is prohibited by the Agreement (as it is in Art 37 para 1 
SAA) within the meaning of Art VI of GATT. In the case of breach, the par-
ties have the right to take appropriate measures in accordance with the 
WTO Agreement on Implementation of Art VI of GATT and the conditions 
laid down in the Joint Declaration referring to Arts 21, 22 and 23. The 
parties are obliged to inform the Joint Committee and the concerned par-
ty accordingly (Art 22). In the Joint Declaration, the parties ensure that 
they shall not apply anti-dumping, countervailing or safeguard meas-
ures until they have developed internal procedures for them and until 
they have determined technical issues relating to the application of those 
measures. 
Independently of WTO rules and the above-mentioned Joint Declara-
tion, the Agreement foresees General Safeguards. In accordance with the 
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General Safeguards provisions, the importing party may apply bilateral 
safeguard measures to another exporting party in accordance with the 
procedure set out in Art 24 in the event that any product is imported in 
such increased quantities and under such conditions from a party to the 
Agreement so as to cause or threaten to cause any serious injury to do-
mestic producers of like or directly competitive products in the territory 
of the importing party or any serious disturbances in any sector of the 
economy which could bring serious deterioration in the economic situa-
tion of the importing party (Art 23).
The Agreement also foresees a special protection mechanism for 
agricultural products. This is provided on account of the sensitivity of 
the agricultural products market. In the case where imports of products 
originating in one party, which are the subject of concessions granted in 
Annex 3, cause serious disturbance to the markets or to the domestic 
regulatory mechanisms in another party, the parties are obliged to enter 
into consultations immediately and fi nd a solution. Even before resolving 
the problem, the concerned party may take the appropriate measures it 
deems necessary (Art 23 bis).
If in any of the parties a serious balance of payments diffi culty or any 
imminent threat of it arises, the party concerned may adopt restrictive 
import measures in accordance with the WTO rules. The duration of such 
measures is limited and the intensity is not to go beyond what is neces-
sary to remedy the balance of payments situation (Art 25).
If a party determines that dumping is taking place in trade with an-
other party within the meaning of Art VI of GATT, appropriate measures 
can be taken in accordance with the WTO Agreement on the Implementa-
tion of Art VI of GATT and in accordance with the Joint Declaration relat-
ing to this article. It is necessary to inform the concerned party and the 
Joint Committee (Art 22).
New trade issues cover the fi elds of trade in services, investments, 
public procurement and protection of intellectual property, all in accord-
ance with international standards. In each of these fi elds, the evolution-
ary clause is provided in order to accelerate the procedures, but also to 
allow for the possibility to determine better conditions. 
The Agreement defi nes trade in services in accordance with Art I and 
XXVIII of the General Agreement on Trade in Services - GATS (Art 26). 
The parties are obliged to broaden their cooperation for the purpose of 
liberalisation and the mutual opening of their services markets in respect 
of European integration, and in the frames of GATS (Art 27). The Agree-
ment provides for the evolutionary clause with the objective of fostering 
trade in services which will be at the centre of future liberalisation in 
SEE. In accordance with the clause, the Joint Committee will annually 
review this cooperation and, if appropriate, will recommend launching 
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negotiations for further liberalisation in accordance with Art V of GATS 
(Art 29). It is agreed to promote the development of electronic commerce 
between the parties, in particular in connection with cooperating on mar-
ket access (Art 28).
Regarding investment, the parties are obliged to establish and main-
tain a stable, favourable and transparent position, legal protection and 
security in their territory and to regulate their legislation in that respect. 
They are also obliged to exchange information within the Joint Commit-
tee (Arts 32 and 33). A remark needs to be made that the countries have 
already concluded bilateral investment agreements which are still in force 
and which are enumerated in Annex 6 (Art 30). The evolutionary clause 
was formed within the scope of broadening investments and in respect of 
coordinating policies and investments, reviewing investment legislation, 
exchanging information within the Joint Committee, and reviewing the 
possibility of approving similar supplementary advantages to investors of 
one of the other parties, or to investors of third countries (Art 33). 
Public procurement, within the meaning of this Agreement, is pro-
curement conducted by central or sub-central government entities or 
other relevant entities. The defi nitions of Art I of the WTO Agreement on 
Government Procurement apply (Art 34). All the provisions of the Agree-
ment relating to services (Arts 26 to 29) are not to be understood as 
imposing an obligation for public procurement procedures. The parties 
are obliged to conduct public procurement procedures in the spirit of 
open and effective competition, in a transparent and reasonable manner, 
and all suppliers have to be treated equally. Measures relating to duties 
or other measures relating to imports are not included within the pub-
lic procurement provisions of the Agreement. It is necessary to ensure 
that all the parties receive equally favourable treatment at the latest by 
1 May 2010 (Art 35). The public procurement provisions anticipate the 
evolutionary clause with the goal of accelerating the process of opening 
government procurement markets towards other parties. If a party grants 
advantages to a third county, it shall also arrange for opportunities for 
other parties to the Agreement to enter negotiations so that these advan-
tages may be extended to them on a reciprocal basis (Art 36). 
In the fi eld of intellectual property rights, the parties are obliged to 
enable effi cient protection in accordance with international standards, 
especially in accordance with TRIPS, and to continue to apply the agree-
ments listed in Annex 7. The parties who are not parties to those agree-
ments are obliged to join them and implement the obligations arising from 
those agreements not later than 1 May 2014 (Art 38). Again, the evolution-
ary clause lays down that if a party agrees to more favourable conditions 
with a third party, it shall arrange for consultations with the other parties 
with a view to extending these advantages to them on a reciprocal basis. 
578 Marta KrizmaniÊ: The New CEFTA with Special Reference to its Infl uence on Accession...
Functioning rules relate to the composition, competence and pro-
cedures of the Joint Committee; the fulfi lment of obligations of the par-
ties; consultations; arbitration; the obligation of the parties to promptly 
publish legislation relating to the issues covered in the Agreement; the 
obligation of the parties to respond to all requests made by another party; 
the possibility of a party to maintain or establish a customs union, free 
trade area or to arrange for frontier trade to the extent that it does not 
affect negatively the trade regime of the Agreement; the duration of the 
Agreement for an indefi nite period of time; the procedure of denunciation; 
and the depositary of the Agreement (the Republic of Croatia).
Since the parties may wish to make further effort for better and closer 
relations and cooperation and to make further and quicker liberalisation 
of a higher level, the Agreement contains evolutionary clauses in several 
places. The general evolutionary clause is placed at the end of the Agree-
ment. It enables the party which considers that it would be in the inter-
est of the economies of the other parties to develop and deepen relations 
arising out of the Agreement, to present such a proposal to other parties. 
This proposal can be further presented to the Joint Committee which will 
analyse it and make a proposal to open respective negotiations (Art 45). 
Comparing the new CEFTA with the old CEFTA, the novelty of the 
former is the formation of a permanent secretariat located in Brussels to 
support the Joint Committee which consists of the representatives of all 
parties and which supervises and implements the Agreement. 
Four Joint Declarations are positioned at the very end of the Agree-
ment. The fi rst one relates to the obligation of applying several WTO rules 
irrespective of whether a party is at the same time a member of WTO. The 
second Joint Declaration relates to the cooperation between the parties 
and their mutual Assistance. The last two Declarations relate respectively 
to Arts 20 and 21 on one hand, and to Arts 21, 22 and 23 on the other.
5 Conclusion
Many people defi ne the importance of CEFTA as a kind of training to 
enter the EU, ‘the preparation and waiting room for EU membership’,41 
‘the waiting room or preparatory step’,42 or ‘the lobby of the EU’.43 
41  B Ranogajec ‘»lanstvo u CEFTA-i - Ëekaonica za EU’ Interview with O Spevec, Privredni 
vjesnik (Zagreb 28 October 2002) <http://www.privredni-vjesnik.hr/index.cgi?A=I&SIF
=00001&BR=003273&DA=20021028> accessed 29 June 2007 (author’s translation from 
Croatian to English.
42  O Spevec, ‘Republika Hrvatska - Ëlanica CEFTA-e’ (2003) RaËunovodstvo, revizija i fi nan-
cije, 3, 17 (author’s translation from Croatian to English).
43 ‘U CEFTA-u ulazi Makedonija, otvorena vrata jugoistoku Europe’ (29 November 2005) 
<http://www.mingorp.hr/default.asp?id=923&glink=> accessed 29 June 2007 (author’s 
translation from Croatian to English.
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The biggest and most frequently mentioned benefi t of the old CEFTA 
was the common preparation it provided for integration into the EU mar-
ket. Consequently, the conclusion can be drawn that CEFTA 2006 is a 
good instrument, offering a secure route towards EU membership and 
providing preparation for the internal market of the EU. Only secondarily 
is it a good step for the economies and trade relations of the parties. In 
the past two waves of accession, CEFTA was the instrument of the new 
EU members that facilitated integration into the EU through common 
preparation and through the process of harmonising legislation with that 
of the EU.
The new CEFTA will also not only offer sound preparation but will 
also be a good instrument for accession to the EU. The Stabilisation and 
Association Process and the regional approach provisions constitute part 
of the stabilisation and association agreements. They also make a dif-
ference between the Stabilisation and Association Agreements and the 
European Agreements. Therefore, CEFTA plays an extra role, acting an 
instrument of regional cooperation.
To what extent the new CEFTA can help Croatia enter the EU will 
only be seen following the achievement of this most important goal of 
Croatia’s foreign policy. Without doubt, the aspects covered in this paper 
suggest that the new CEFTA will play a signifi cant part in Croatia’s ac-
cession to the EU.
